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Labor and Employment
by Brooks Allan Suttle
and Kandis Wood Jackson*
There were a number of important decisions in the labor and
employment law arena handed down by courts within the Eleventh
Circuit during the January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013 survey
period.' The following is a discussion of the most significant of those
opinions.
I.

THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT

Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank or the Act)2 in the wake of the great
financial collapse of 2008. Ever since, federal courts have struggled to
interpret Dodd-Frank with regard to a wide range of issues that the Act
left either unsettled or unaddressed.' In Pruett v. BlueLinx Holdings,

* Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Pennsylvania (B.A., 2002); Emory University Law School (J.D., 2012). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Duke University
(B.A, cum laude, 2008); Harvard Law School (J.D., 2013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of labor and employment law during the prior survey period, see
Patrick L. Coyle, Alexandra Garrison Barnett & Brooks A. Suttle, Labor and Employment,
Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 64 MERCER L. REv. 965 (2013).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.
titles 7, 12, 15, 22, and 42).
3. In addition to numerous ambiguities and inconsistencies in Dodd-Frank's statutory
language, the legislative purpose and congressional intent underlying parts of the Act can
be difficult to discern, and may even appear to be at odds with regard to certain provisions.
This is often attributed to the way in which Congress, responding to immense public
pressure to act, hastily debated and passed Dodd-Frank as an amalgamation of a variety
of bills already in existence at the time, rather than drafting the Act anew from the ground
up. Indeed, one commentator even described Dodd-Frank, not entirely inaccurately, as "a
trash-compactor collection of unrelated provisions thrown together in the mad rush to pass
a bill, any bill." See David John, PassedHastily,Dodd-FrankIs a CounterproductiveMess,
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Inc.,' Judge J. Owen Forrester of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia held that whistleblowers bringing
retaliation claims under section 78u-6(h)(1XA) of Dodd-Frank are not
entitled to a jury trial.5 The decision, an issue of first impression
among the federal courts with regard to so-called Dodd-Frank whistleblower plaintiffs, sets an important precedent that could significantly
impact the calculus of both employers and employees in deciding
whether and how to bring or defend against Dodd-Frank whistleblower
claims.
In Pruett, the plaintiff was a former compliance manager at the
defendant company who claimed that he was retaliated against for
reporting what he alleged were potential violations of the securities laws
to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which then
communicated the allegations to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). After the plaintiff filed his complaint, the company moved
the court to dismiss plaintiff's demand for a jury trial, arguing that no
such right was provided for by the Act.' That is, while Dodd-Frank
specifically amended the existing whistleblower provisions in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)' to include an express right to a jury trial,'
no similar provision was incorporated into the new whistleblower
protections contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act),9 which were created by Dodd-Frank and pursuant to which the
plaintiff had brought his retaliation claim.' 0

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 17, 2011) available at http://www.usnews.com/debateclub/should-the-dodd-frank-act-be-repealed/passed-hastily-dodd-frank-is-a-counter
productive-mess.
4. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185551 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 2013).
5. Id. at *3, *10; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1XA) (2012).
6. Pruett, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185551, at *2.
7. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(E) (2012) (guaranteeing plaintiffs who qualify as
whistleblowers under SOX the right to a jury trial). The provision was added to SOX by
way of amendment in section 922(c) of Dodd-Frank. 18 U.S.C. § 922(c), 124 Stat. at 1842.
9. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78pp).
10. Section 922(a) of Dodd-Frank amended the Exchange Act to provide new antiretaliation protections for employees who qualify as whistleblowers under the Exchange
Act, as distinct from SOX whistleblower plaintiffs. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78(h) (2012) with
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). Specifically, Dodd-Frank added a new section to the Exchange
Act, § 21F, entitled "Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection." (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6). Within this new section, there is a provision that an
employer may not "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or
in any other manner discriminate against" an employee who provides certain types of
information to the SEC regarding alleged violations of the securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(hX 1)(A). The Exchange Act whistleblower statute, however, is silent on the right to a
jury trial, unlike the amended SOX provisions. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A), with
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Because the Exchange Act is silent on the issue of a jury right for
whistleblower plaintiffs, the court in Pruett began with the Seventh
Amendment' and its traditional two-part analysis.12 Under that test,
courts first "compare the nature of the issues to be resolved to eighteenth century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the
merger of the courts of law and equity," and then "assess whether the
remedy sought is legal or equitable in nature."" The court found that
the first factor favored a jury right as the retaliation claim at issue was
most analogous to the common-law tort of wrongful discharge.'
Regarding the second factor of the Seventh Amendment analysis-the
nature of the remedy sought-the Dodd-Frank amendments to the
Exchange Act limit the remedies available to a successful whistleblower
plaintiff to the following: "(i) reinstatement with the same seniority
status that the individual would have had, but for the discrimination; (ii)
[two] times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the individual,
with interest; and (iii) compensation for litigation costs, expert witness
fees, and reasonable attorneys fees.""
In Pruett,the court observed that "reinstatement, hiring, and back pay
are generally considered equitable remedies,"16 which can be defined as
remedies intended to make the employee "whole."" Thus, the key issue

18 U.S.C. § 1514A. It was under Dodd-Frank that the plaintiff brought his retaliatory
discharge claim. Pruett, 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 185551, at *1.
Notably, prior to the Dodd-Frank amendments, SOX was also silent as to a jury right for
whistleblower plaintiff. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Constructionand Applications
of Whistleblower Provision of Sarbanes-OxleyAct, 18 US.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1), FED. 2D 315
(2006). The majority of courts that considered the issue concluded that no such right
existed. See Jones v. Home Fed. Bank, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3579, at *19-20 (D. Idaho
Jan. 14, 2010) (citing cases addressing the right to a jury trial for SOX whistleblower
plaintiffs and deciding to follow "the majority of cases that have . .. held that no right to
a jury trial exists"). See also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1989)
(holding that the right to a jury trial is not guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment where
only equitable remedies are involved); Walton v. Nova Info. Sys., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1031,
1034 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) (holding that "since the back pay damages under the remedies
provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are restitutionary damages intended to 'make the
employee whole,' such damages are equitable in nature, not legal, and do not give Plaintiff
the right to a jury trial").
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
12. Pruett,2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 185551, at *3-4.
13. Id. at *4-5 (quoting Stewart v. KHD Deutz of Am. Corp., 75 F.3d 1522, 1525 (11th
Cir. 1996)). Furthermore, "[t]he nature of the remedy sought is the more important inquiry
in [the] analysis." Stewart, 75 F.3d at 1525.
14. Pruett, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185551, at *5.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C).
16. 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 185551, at *5.
17. Id. at *5-6.
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before the court was whether the doubling of a back-pay award under
§ 78u-6(hX1)(CXii) made the statutory remedy more than restitutionary
or equitable in nature, moving it instead into the field of compensatory,
liquidated, or punitive damages, as the plaintiff contended."8
Siding with the defendants, the court held that "[t]he purpose of the
remedies in § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) is clearly to place the employee in the
position he would have been absent any retaliatory actions."" Thus,
the remedies available for Exchange Act whistleblowers are restitutionary in nature, and the court did not find the fact that the back-pay
award is doubled under the statute to be significant in its analysis.o
To the contrary, "the automatic doubling is a calculation that lacks the
discretion generally associated with monetary damages awarded by a
jury."" As such, there is nothing for a jury to decide, as the Exchange
Act's whistleblower provisions do not require a determination of
"willfulness" before the proper remedy can be determined.22 Rather,
"[tihe court simply calculates the back pay-which is its responsibility
and not that of a jury-and doubles that amount."'
To conclude its analysis, the court also considered the legislative
history of Dodd-Frank with regard to whistleblower laws.' As noted
previously, the Exchange Act's whistleblower provisions, enacted by
Dodd-Frank, are closely analogous to the SOX whistleblower provisions
as they existed prior to being amended by Dodd-Frank to include an

18. Id. at *6-7 & n.1. In Pruett, the court also held, after the plaintiff conceded the
argument, that under the plain language of the Exchange Act, punitive damages are not
an available remedy for whistleblower plaintiffs. Id. at *2. Accordingly, the court granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs punitive damages claim. Id.; see also
Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939, at *19 (D. Conn. Sept. 25,
2012) (granting motion to strike punitive damages from a Dodd-Frank whistleblower claim
and limit the plaintiff to the remedies expressly available in the statute).
19. Pruett,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185551, at *8.
20. Id. at *6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *6, *8. Compare Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125,
129, 130 (1985) (holding that damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) are liquidated and punitive in nature because they require a "willfulness" finding),
with Jordan v. United States Postal Serv., 379 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that damages under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) are liquidated but are not penalties because they do not require a finding of
willfulness).
23. Pruett, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185551, at *6. Under Dodd-Frank, relief for a
prevailing whistleblower plaintiff "shall" include reinstatement, two times the amount of
back pay owed, and compensation for various costs incurred in bringing the action. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(hX1)C).
24. Pruett, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185551, at *9-10.
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express right to a jury trial.25 The remedies available under SOX,
however, also include "compensation for any special damages," 26 which
the court found to be "arguably broader" than the remedies available
under Dodd-Frank." Yet the majority of courts considering the preamendment SOX whistleblower remedies nonetheless found them to be
equitable in nature, and thus they did not entitle whistleblower
plaintiffs to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.' Moreover,
the court noted that when Congress passed Dodd-Frank, it chose to
specifically amend SOX to include a jury right, but did not include a
similar provision for Exchange Act whistleblowers "despite being aware
of the legal controversy surrounding whether a jury trial was available
under Sarbanes-Oxley."29 As Congress, through Dodd-Frank, amended
both SOX and the Exchange Act at the same time, the discrepancy
between the two statutes' whistleblower provisions would appear to
indicate congressional intent not to provide a jury right under the
latter.o Pursuant to its analysis, then, the court in Pruett granted the
defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's request for a jury trial.
Judge Forrester's decision in Pruett sets a significant precedent within
the Eleventh Circuit on an important issue of first impression. In
addition to offering some clarification on one of Dodd-Frank's many
ambiguities, the decision also provides some level of certainty as to who
the fact-finder will be at an Exchange Act whistleblower trial. Overall,
then, the decision will probably be seen as a "win" for employers, since
juries are generally considered to be more sympathetic toward civil-suit
plaintiffs than judges in these types of cases. Indeed, the lack of an
automatic jury right under the Dodd-Frank amendments may discourage
some former employees from bringing frivolous whistleblower claims.
While it remains to be seen how the issue will play out before other
courts, unless and until Congress amends the Exchange Act's whistleblower provisions as enacted by Dodd-Frank, it seems likely that the
Pruett decision will represent persuasive authority outside of the
Eleventh Circuit.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(C).
Pruett,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185551, at *8.
Id. at *9, *10; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Pruett,2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185551, at *9, *10.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185551, at *10.
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II. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Under long-standing Eleventh Circuit precedent established in Lynn's
Food Stores, Inc. v. United States,32 settlements of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)33 claims between employers and employees are
unenforceable unless they are supervised and approved by either a court
or the Department of Labor (DOL).' In Nall v. Mal-Motels, Inc.," the
Eleventh Circuit recently expanded the Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. rule to
also apply to settlements reached between employers and former employees.36 In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit went further than any other
court of appeals thus far in prohibiting private waivers of FLSA
claims, 7 and in fact set itself at odds with a recent trend toward
permitting some FLSA settlements that has developed in other
jurisdictions.3 ' Before turning to the Nall decision, however, a brief
review of the history of private waivers under the FLSA is warranted.
In the FLSA as it was originally enacted in 1938, "[nlothing was
mentioned as to the ability of parties to enter into private settlements."39 Inevitably, however, the issue of whether FLSA liability
could be waived by agreement soon made its way before the United
States Supreme Court. In the dual cases of Brooklyn Savings Bank v.
O'Neil 4o and D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi,4' the Court first read into
the FLSA a prohibition on private waivers based on public-policy
concerns.4 2 As the Court observed in O'Neil, such an analysis should
ordinarily begin and end with the statute itself 43 However, because
"[nieither the statutory language, the legislative reports nor the debates
indicate[d] that the question at issue was specifically considered and
resolved by Congress," the Court found it necessary to look to the

32. 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982).
33. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219).
34. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d at 1355.
35. 723 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2013).
36. Id. at 1307.
37. Id. at 1307-08. The validity of a FLSA settlement depends on the enforceability of
the employee's waiver of his or her right to bring a claim pursuant to the statute, and the
terms "waiver" and "settlement" are more or less interchangeable in this context. Id.
38. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
39. Martinez v. Bohls Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608,619 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (providing
a detailed review of the history of the FLSA and the case law interpreting it with regard
to settlements of claims).
40. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
41. 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
42. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 115.
43. See O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 705 ("[Tlhe question of whether the statutory right may be
waived depends upon the intention of Congress as manifested in the particular statute.").
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policies underlying the statute to attempt to discern congressional
intent." In considering those policies, the Court found that allowing
private compromises of FLSA liquidated-damages claims could threaten
the Act's legislative purpose of guaranteeing workers a certain minimum
wage, because employers might use their superior bargaining power to
extract settlement agreements from their employees for amounts far less
than would be recoverable under the statute."' Accordingly, in both
O'Neil and Gangi the Court held that Congress could not have intended
for such settlements to be enforced.'
Shortly after O'Neil and Gangi were decided, Congress explicitly
addressed the settlement issue, first by passing Section 3 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 4 to allow for the compromise of certain
then-existing FLSA claims, 4' and then by adding section 16(c) to the
FLSA through the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949,49 Which
allows for settlement of FLSA claims under the supervision of the
Secretary of Labor.so Many considered these amendments to be a
negative reaction to O'Neil and Gangi, and thus a sign that "a Congress
relatively contemporary with the passage of the FLSA in 1938 viewed
these decisions as contrary to the intent of the FLSA."s' Indeed, O'Neil
and Gangi have been ignored by some courts in light of the FLSA
amendments as being inconsistent with both congressional intent and

44. Id. at 705-06.
45. Id. at 706-07. Under the FLSA, employers who violate the Act's minimum-wage
provisions are automatically liable for liquidated damages in an amount equal to the wages
owed. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). In O'Neil and Gangi, the defendant employers sought
to enforce settlements reached with their employees that purported to pay back wages
owed but waived the employees' right to bring a claim for liquidated damages under the
Act. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 112; O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 700. In both cases, however, the Court
made clear that it was leaving open the question of whether private settlements were
permissible where there was a bona fide dispute as to FLSA liability, as opposed to a
dispute simply over the proper amount owed. See Gangi, 328 U.S. at 114-15 (declining to
consider "the possibility of compromises in other situations which may arise, such as a
dispute over the number of hours worked or the regular rate of employment"); O'Neil, 324
U.S. at 714 ("Our decision. . . has not necessitated a determination of what limitation, if
any, section 16(b) ... places on the validity of agreements between an employer and
employee to settle claims arising under the Act if the settlement is made as the result of
a bona fide dispute between the two parties, in consideration of a bona fide compromise
and settlement."); see also Martinez, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 620-21.
46. Gangi, 328 U.S. at 114, 116; O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 707.
47. Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (2012)).
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 253.
49. Pub. L. No. 81-393, ch. 736, 63 Stat. 910 (1949) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)
(2012)).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
51. Martinez, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
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the general favorability of settlements as a means of promoting judicial
economy.52
Several decades after O'Neil and Gangi, the Eleventh Circuit in Lynn's
Food Stores, Inc. refused to approve an FLSA waiver that was made
outside of the two recognized avenues for settling such claims: (1)
settlements made under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor as
provided for in section 16(c) of the FLSA; or (2) settlements entered by
a district court as a stipulated judgment on claims brought directly by
employees against their employer under section 16(b).53 Indeed, the
Court held that DOL- or court-approved settlements are the "only two
ways in which back wage claims arising under the FLSA can be settled
or compromised by employees,"' thus answering the question left open
by the Supreme Court by prohibiting private waivers even where there
is a bona fide dispute as to liability. In deciding that private waivers
are never permissible under the FLSA, the Eleventh Circuit based its
strict reading of the statute on the policy concerns that were identified
in O'Neil and Gangi." Specifically, the court focused on the policy

52. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 861-62 & n.42
(5th Cir. 1975) (concluding that the Portal-to-Portal Act was meant to overrule O'Neil and
Gangi and noting that otherwise the courts would be overburdened with unnecessary
litigation).
53. Lynn's Food Stores,Inc., 679 F.2d at 1352-53. The permissibility of court-approved
settlements was established in a decision by the former United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, which is binding on the Eleventh Circuit. Jarrard v. Se. Shipbuilding
Corp., 163 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1947).
54. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d at 1352; see also Martinez,361 F. Supp. 2d at 631
(noting that "[n]o court other than the Eleventh Circuit has expressly held that such a
settlement is prohibited").
55. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d at 1352-53. Just as in O'Neil and Gangi, it was
necessary to look to policy and legislative purpose because the FLSA, even as amended,
does not expressly prohibit settlements where there is a bona fide dispute over liability.
Rather, Congress amended the statute to allow for supervised settlements but neither
endorsed nor rejected the possibility of there being other, non-statutory methods for
compromising FLSA claims. See Martinez, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 626 ("Whether Congress
intended section 16(c) to be the exclusive manner by which to settle claims does not have
a clear answer."). As such, other circuit courts have reached different conclusions than the
Eleventh Circuit when addressing this issue.
The Fifth Circuit, for example, recently followed Martinez in affirming that "a private
compromise of claims under the FLSA is permissible where there exists a bona fide dispute
as to liability." Martin v. Spring Break '83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Martinez, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 633). In Martin, the Fifth Circuit enforced a private
FLSA settlement agreement negotiated by the employees' union and precluded the
individual employees from later asserting FLSA claims in litigation. The court reasoned
that because the settlement was negotiated by the union, it did not raise the normal publicpolicy concerns regarding unequal bargaining power between employer and employee. See
id. at 257; see also Picerni v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378-79
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determination that a supervised settlement "is more likely to reflect a
reasonable compromise of disputed issues than a mere waiver of
statutory rights brought about by an employer's overreaching."5
The recent decision in Nall is significant because it reaffirms the
Eleventh Circuit's commitment to Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. and the
requirement that all FLSA settlements be approved for fairness, despite
recent contrary decisions in other circuits." In Nall, the plaintiff quit
her job as a front desk clerk at Mal-Motels because she was not being
paid overtime and filed suit against her former employer for back wages
under the FLSA. Subsequently, she was contacted by the owner of the
company, who asked her to meet him at a motel without her attorney to
discuss a settlement. The owner told the former employee that she was
"ruining his business," and offered her between two and three thousand
dollars to sign two documents he presented her with-a voluntary
dismissal and a letter to her attorney informing him the case was
settled. Nall later testified that she felt pressured and needed the
money because she was homeless at the time. There was no written
settlement agreement signed by the parties."
After the plaintiffs voluntary dismissal was filed and initially rejected
by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
because Nall had not moved to appear pro se, the owner hired an
attorney to enforce the settlement." The district court approved the
settlement, over the plaintiff's objections, as "a fair and reasonable
resolution of a bona fide dispute" under the FLSA, and dismissed the
case.60 The plaintiff appealed the case to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing
that the settlement approved by the district court did not meet the
requirements of Lynn's Food Stores, Inc.e"
Arguably, the public-policy concerns expressed in that case regarding
employers' unfair bargaining power over employees would not apply

(E.D.N.Y. 2013). In Picerni, a New York federal court found that Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure applies to FLSA cases, and that plaintiffs may voluntarily dismiss
their FLSA claims after accepting an offer of judgment and before the defendant files an
answer. 925 F. Supp. 2d at 375; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. The court did note, however, that the
settlement could still be scrutinized for fairness-that is, if the plaintiff later decides to
challenge the settlement, the court in the subsequent action would be required to scrutinize
it for fairness before agreeing to enforce it. Picerni, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 378-79.
56. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d at 1354.
57. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
58. Nall, 723 F.3d at 1305-06.
59. Id. at 1306.
60. Id. (quoting Nall v. Mal-Motels, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist LEXIS 76441 (M.D. Fla. June
1, 2012)).
61. See id.
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where the individual waiving his or her FLSA claim is no longer
employed by the company.62 The Eleventh Circuit, however, expressed
its belief in Nall that the same factors that would lead to uneven
bargaining power between an employer and a current employee were
also applicable to the relationship between an employer and a former
employee, and thus the Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. rule still applies."
That is, individuals who need their back wages promptly may still be at
a disadvantage in bargaining with a former employer, and permitting
employers to escape liquidated damages through private settlements
"would undermine the deterrent effect of the statutory provisions.""
Having decided that Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. applied, the court held
in Nall that the district court's approval of the settlement could only be
upheld if the district court entered a stipulated judgment approving the
settlement." But because a stipulated judgment requires the approval
of both parties, and because the plaintiff objected to the judgment, the
court of appeals held that the settlement between Nall and Mal-Motels
was neither supervised by the DOL nor memorialized by a stipulated
judgment from the court, as required by the Lynn's Food Stores, Inc.
rule.6 ' Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's
approval and remanded the case.
Similar to Lynn's Food Stores, Inc., the facts in Nall were unusually
egregious with regard to the plaintiffs bargaining position, and the
defendant's actions seemed clearly intended to pressure the plaintiff into
accepting an unfair compromise of her FLSA rights." Thus, while Nall
reinforced and even expanded the Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. holding that

62. See generally id. at 1307. As the court explained, "[tihe most cause for concern
exists when the plaintiff employee is still working for the defendant employer. An
employee is subject to the supervision and personnel decisions of her employer and the
possibility of retaliation may pervade the negotiations," which is not the case with a former
employee who negotiates a settlement. Id.
63. Id. at 1306-07.
64. Id. at 1307.
65. Id. at 1308.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. As discussed above, the plaintiff in Nall, who was homeless and in desperate need
of money, was asked by her former employer to come without her attorney to a motel room
to discuss settlement and was offered between two and three thousand dollars in exchange
for signing two documents that she was not given time to read. Id. at 1305-06. In Lynn's
FoodStores, Inc., the employees had not brought suit before the employer approached them
offering a settlement for far less than the amount they were owed as determined by the
DOL. See 679 F.2d at 1354. Moreover, the employees were mostly unaware that they had
any rights under the FLSA; they had not consulted with an attorney before signing the
settlement agreements, and many of them did not speak English. Id.
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only settlements supervised by the DOL or entered by a court in a
stipulated judgment are enforceable in the Eleventh Circuit, both cases
would be easily distinguishable from those where fully informed and
well-represented parties reached an out-of-court settlement for a
voluntary. dismissal, and then one party later sought to renege on the
agreement. Indeed, the court in Nall specifically noted that it was not
deciding "whether a judgment approving an out-of-court agreement
entered with the assistance of counsel is a stipulated judgment even if
the attorney later objects."" In such a case, the Eleventh Circuit might
very well be amenable to the more pragmatic approach taken in some
other circuits, which would allow for private settlements where the
danger of unequal bargaining power and employer overreach is not
present.o0
As the Fifth Circuit has recently recognized,7 1 the policy considerations upon which the holding in Lynn's Foods Stores, Inc. is based are
not necessarily applicable to situations where employers have negotiated
at arms' length a fair settlement of an FLSA claim with an employee
represented by competent counsel.72 Moreover, a strict rule prohibiting
otherwise valid settlements of bona fide disputes over FLSA liability
discourages the amicable settling of wage disputes, creates uncertainty
for employers regarding confidentiality, and uses up valuable judicial
resources on many cases that could be fairly settled without resorting to
full-on litigation. Regardless, what the Eleventh Circuit will do in such
a situation remains to be seen. What is certain is that, after Nall,
employers in the Eleventh Circuit will be taking a large risk if they
pursue private settlements of FLSA claims with any employee, current
or former, that include a voluntary dismissal of the plaintiffs claim
rather than a stipulated judgment entered by the court.
III.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Addressing an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the
court of appeals in Sims v. MVM, Inc." affirmed the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia holding that an

69. 723 F.3d at 1308 n.3.
70. See Martin, 688 F.3d at 249; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text. Indeed,
even the Eleventh Circuit has approved of the dismissal of an FLSA claim pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) without judicial approval of the payment where the employee was paid
his back wages in full as well as liquidated damages, but without attorney fees. See
Dionne v. Floormasters Enters., Inc., 667 F.3d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 2012).
71. Martin, 688 F3d at 256 & n.10.
72. Id. at 257.
73. 704 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2013).
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employee claiming age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA or the Act)74 must show that age was the "butfor" cause of his employer's adverse action, even when the employee's
claim is based on the "cat's paw" theory of liability." In so doing, the
Eleventh Circuit made it clear that the Supreme Court's holding in
Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc.7 -- that an ADEA plaintiff must
prove that discrimination was the "but-for" cause of the adverse
employment action-applies to ADEA cases in which the employee
alleges that the decision maker acted based on the discriminatory
animus of another employee.
In Sims, MVM, Inc. (MVM) contracted with a correctional facilities
provider in November 2007 to provide secure custody and transport
services for federal prisoners in custody that were being held at various
detention centers around Atlanta, Georgia. Because this was a start-up
contract, MVM had to acquire a workforce. In December 2007, MVM
hired Solomon Sims, Jr. as an operations supervisor. A month later,
MVM hired Arnold Perkins as the project manager and Tom Davis as
the assistant project manager. Davis was Sims's immediate supervisor.78
Sims's responsibilities as operations manager included reviewing
government documentation and preparing the paperwork needed for the
transportation of prisoners between different locations. Over time, Davis
began to notice that Sims made more errors than other supervisors
working on the same contract and that Sims's performance never
improved. Similarly, Perkins observed during evaluations of the
supervisors that the quality and accuracy of Sims's work was poorer
than that of others, that Sims was uncomfortable using the computers
he needed to produce documentation, and that it took Sims longer to
prepare documents than it did other supervisors. In addition, other
supervisors told Perkins that they sometimes had to correct Sims's
paperwork before it was submitted to Perkins for review.79
Around the same time, in March 2008, the vice president of MVM
notified Perkins that he needed to reduce the number of supervisors
working on the prisoner transport project because the contract was
substantially over budget. At first, Perkins delayed taking any action,
but he was eventually instructed by the vice president to eliminate two

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012)).
Sims, 704 F.3d at 1334.
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
Sims, 704 F.3d at 1335-36 (discussing Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-78).
Id. at 1329-30.
Id. at 1330-31.
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of the eight supervisors by August 11, 2008. Perkins immediately held
individual meetings with each of the eight supervisors and Davis to
advise the supervisors of their reduction-in-force (RIF) status. During
those meetings, each supervisor except for Sims recommended that Sims
be included in the RIF. During Perkins and Davis's individual meeting
with Sims, Perkins advised Sims that he was to be included in the RIF.
Sims was 71 years old at the time. 0
Sims filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging he was unlawfully terminated
because of his age. In his charge, Sims claimed that Davis told him he
was "too slow in performing [his] job," that "[i]f we have a cutback in
management, I'm going to recommend you be terminated," and, "mind
you, age has nothing to do with it." Later, Sims alleged that Davis told
him "[y]ou're old and slow," but Sims never claimed that Davis made any
other purportedly derogatory age-related remarks to him. The district
court granted MVM summary judgment on Sims's ADEA claims."
On appeal, Sims argued that Perkins, the clear decision maker, acted
with discriminatory bias based on Sims's age when he terminated him.
Sims also argued that Perkins's termination decision was influenced by
the discriminatory animus of Davis, who was not a decision maker. In
other words, Sims argued that Perkins acted as a so-called cat's paw for
Davis's biases, and that MVM was therefore liable for Sims's unlawful
termination. 82
Addressing Sims's first argument, the Eleventh Circuit quickly held
that age discrimination was not the "but-for" factor in Perkins's decision
to lay off Sims." In Gross, the Supreme Court established that an
ADEA plaintiff claiming that his decision maker acted with unlawful
bias must demonstrate that, but for the plaintiffs age, the decision
maker would not have made its adverse employment decision." In

80. Id. at 1330-31, 1334.
81. Id. at 1329-31.
82. Id. at 1334-35; see also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011) (holding
that under a cat's paw theory of liability, an employer may be liable for the discriminatory
animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment
decision); Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining
that the cat's paw "theory provides that causation may be established if the plaintiff shows
that the [decision maker] followed the biased recommendation [of another employee] . . .
[and that] the recommender is using the [decision maker] as a mere conduit, or 'cat's paw'
to give effect to the recommender's discriminatory animus").
83. Sims, 704 F.3d at 1334.
84. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176, 177 (holding that the language "because of" in the
ADEA statute means that a plaintiff must prove that discrimination was the "but-for"
cause of the adverse action).
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Sims, the Eleventh Circuit assumed arguendo that Sims had established
a prima facie case of age discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green" framework, but nonetheless concluded that Sims could
not "sustain his burden of proving that Perkins' age discrimination was
the 'but-for' cause of his inclusion in the RIF."86 Thus, the court
affirmed the district court's holding that Sims did not establish an
ADEA claim based on Perkins's alleged discriminatory animus.
In analyzing Sims's argument for cat's-paw liability, the court first
acknowledged that whether the "but-for" standard used for traditional
ADEA claims applied to ADEA claims based on the cat's-paw-liability
theory was a novel issue for the Eleventh Circuit." Sims argued that,
instead of applying the "but-for" standard to his ADEA cat's-paw claim,
the court should apply a lower standard: the "motivating factor"
standard." His argument relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Staub v. ProctorHospital," in which the Supreme Court held that, in
a Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(USERRA)' case, an employer could only be liable under a cat's-paw
theory of liability if the "subordinate supervisor (1) performs an act
motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended to cause an adverse
employment action, and (2) that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate
employment action.""
Looking to the language of the ADEA and that of USERRA, the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that the "but-for" standard, not the
"motivating factor" standard, applies to ADEA claims based on the cat's
paw theory of liability." The court noted that, unlike USERRA, the
ADEA "states that it is unlawful if an employee suffers adverse
employment action 'because of such individual's age' and therefore the
ADEA "requires a 'but-for' link between the discriminatory animus and
the adverse employment action." Thus, the court concluded, in order
to prevail on his cat's-paw ADEA claim, "Sims must prove that Davis's
animus was a'but-for' cause of, or a determinative influence on, Perkins'
ultimate decision."
Because Sims failed to establish a "but-for" link

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

411 U.S. 792 (1973) (discussing burdens of proof and persuasion in ADEA cases).
Sims, 704 F.3d at 1334.
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1334-35.
Id. at 1335.
131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (1994) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
Sims, 704 F.3d at 1335 (citing Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194).
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1335-36 (quoting 29 U.S.C § 623(a)(1)).
Id. at 1337.
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between Davis's alleged bias and his termination as part of the RIF, the
court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to

MVM. 96

The court focused on four facts to come to this conclusion: First, it
noted that Perkins had been aware of the fact that he would have to
eliminate supervisor positions as part of the RIF for five months and
that he had been evaluating the supervisors' performances during this
time." Second, the Court pointed to the fact that Perkins testified that
the decision to include Sims in the RIF was his decision alone, and was
based on his own personal observations and evaluations.98 The court
next noted that, while Perkins did consult Davis about the supervisors'
performances, Perkins testified that Davis's opinion about Sims merely
confirmed Perkins's own independent opinion about him.99 Lastly, the
court highlighted that, during the meetings Perkins and Davis held with
each of the eight supervisors, "every supervisor except for Sims himself
recommended that Sims should be one of the two who had to be laid
off." 00
Applying the "but-for" standard of causation, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that, based on the aforementioned facts, Sims had "not
established that a reasonable juror could find that. .. Perkins acted as
a mere cat's paw for Davis's discriminatory animus."' 0 Because the
court had already concluded that Sims failed to establish that Perkins's
own bias was the "but-for" cause of his termination, the court affirmed
summary judgment for MVM.o 2
The court's decision in Sims is significant in that it confirms that, in
the Eleventh Circuit, the "but-for" causation standard applies in all
ADEA claims-even ones that are not based directly on the decision
maker's animus. In Staub, the Supreme Court laid out a different
standard of causation for cat's-paw claims, one that more closely
resembles the traditional tort-law standard of proximate cause.' But
the Eleventh Circuit decision in Sims made it clear that an ADEA
plaintiff-no matter his theory of liability-must prove more than
proximate cause to be successful.o' Parsing the statutory language,
the court in Sims concluded that the ADEA has a higher burden of proof

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194.
See Sims, 704 F.3d at 1334.
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than does USERRA and Title VII-statutes that do not use the phrase
"because of" in their discrimination provisions.'o In ADEA claims, the
plaintiff must claim that, but for his age, he would not have suffered the
alleged adverse employment action.106
The Eleventh Circuit noted that it was not the only circuit that had
so concluded-in fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Simmons v. Sykes Enterprises, Inc.'? similarly found that
Staub's lower causation requirement cannot be applied to age-discrimination cases because then the plaintiff would only "need to prove her
supervisor's animus was somehow related to the termination and not
0 The
that the animus was necessary to bring about the termination."o'
latter standard that the discriminatory animus was the direct cause of
the plaintiff's adverse employment action, is the "but-for" standard, and
the Tenth Circuit concluded that this standard applies in all ADEA
cases, including those based on the cat's-paw theory of liability.'
Thus, in both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, an ADEA plaintiff has
a higher burden of proof than in a Title VII or USERRA claim, even if
that plaintiff is claiming that the decision maker acted based on another
supervisor's discriminatory animus.
IV. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

In Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co.,"o the Eleventh Circuit ruled for
the first time that an employee claiming that his employer violated the
provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the Act)"'
that prohibits employers from requiring employees to take non-jobrelated medical examinations does not have to be disabled to bring his
claim." 2 Instead, the court held that an ADA plaintiff bringing such
a challenge need only be an "employee," according to the text of the ADA
provision at issue in that case.'11
In 1999, Franklin Owusu-Ansah began working for Coca-Cola (Coke)
as a customer-service representative at one of Coke's Georgia call
centers. After promoting Owusu-Ansah three times, Coke eventually
promoted him to a quality assurance specialist position in 2005. In that

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id. at 1335.
Id.
647 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 949-50.
715 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2013).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
Owusua-Ansah, 715 F.3d at 1310-11.
Id.
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role, Owusu-Ansah observed frontline call-center associates' performances. He could work from home, but was still required to report to his
Georgia call center for certain meetings.114
During one such meeting in December 2007, Owusu-Ansah, who was
from Ghana, met with his manager, Tanika Cabral, and expressed
concerns about several incidents of alleged racial and ethnic discrimination and harassment by certain managers and employees. In this
meeting, Owusu-Ansah "became agitated ... [and] banged his hand on
where they sat, and said that someone was 'going to pay for
the table
5
this.""'
Concerned, Cabral told her own supervisor about Owusu-Ansah's
behavior during the meeting. Cabral and her supervisor then contacted
Coke's senior human resources manager who, after hearing about
Owusu-Ansah's behavior in his meeting with Cabral, became concerned
"because it sounded as though a threat had been made against an
employee, or employees of the company." Next, the senior resource
manager and one of Coke's security managers contacted Dr. Marcus
McElhaney, Ph.D., an independent psychologist who specialized in threat
assessment and crisis management."'
In a meeting with the human resources manager, Owusu-Ansah
agreed to speak with Dr. McElhaney about his workplace issues. Dr.
McElhaney immediately interviewed Owusu-Ansah about the latter's
concerns with alleged instances of workplace discrimination. After his
conversation with Owusu-Ansah, Dr. McElhaney expressed concerns to
Coke that Owusu-Ansah was not emotionally and psychologically stable,
that he may be "delusional," and that he was a "very stressed and
agitated individual." Dr. McElhaney recommended that Owusu-Ansah
be placed on paid leave to allow for further evaluation, and Coke placed
Owusu-Ansah on such leave effective December 19, 2007.117
Dr. McElhaney continued to assess Owusu-Ansah's mental and
psychological state during the months of December and January, and on
January 22, 2008, Dr. McElhaney informed Coke's human resources
manager that he still had concerns about Owusu-Ansah's emotional
stability. He recommended that Owusu-Ansah undergo a psychiatric
fitness-for-duty evaluation "to rule out the possibility of a mental
condition that could interfere with his ability to successfully and safely
carry out his job duties."'

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1309-10.
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Coke followed Dr. McElhaney's recommendation and informed OwusuAnsah that, as a condition of his continued employment with Coke, he
would have to "complete an evaluation to identify whether there were
any issues that could represent a risk to the safety of others in the
workplace.""' Owusu-Ansah failed to attend his scheduled appointment to take the medical evaluation his doctor recommended. After
Coke notified Owusu-Ansah that he would be placed on unpaid leave if
he did not take the test, Owusu-Ansah eventually took it on March 20,
2008. The results of his test indicated that Owusu-Ansah was "within
normal limits," and Dr. McElhaney accordingly cleared him to return to
work, which he did on April 22, 2008.120
Owusu-Ansah then sued Coke, alleging that what happened to him
was in violation of a provision of the ADA stating that:
[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not
make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an
individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the
disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. 12 1
Specifically, Owusu-Ansah argued that Coke violated this provision by
requiring him to undergo the fitness-for-duty evaluation in March 2008.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granted Coke's motion for summary judgment, finding that OwusuAnsah's fitness-for-duty evaluation was job-related and consistent with
a business necessity, as required by the ADA.' 22 The Eleventh Circuit
agreed that the medical evaluation Owusu-Ansah was required to take
was both job-related and consistent with a business necessity, and
therefore found that it was valid under § 12112(dX4XA) of the ADA. 12s
However, before the court addressed the validity of the medical test
under the ADA provision, it discussed an issue on which the Eleventh
Circuit had yet to rule: "whether an employee claiming protection under
§ 12112(dX4)(A) of the ADA must prove that he is disabled."2 4 In
short, the court's first question in resolving this case was whether the
ADA medical examination provision even applies to non-disabled
employees like Owusu-Ansah at all.

119.
120.
121.
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Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(dX4)(A) (2006).
Owusu-Ansah, 715 F.3d at 1307.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1310.

20141

LABOR & EMPLOYMENT

1085

Looking to the language of § 12112(d)(4)(A), the court concluded that
an ADA plaintiff does not need to be disabled to challenge his employer
under that provision.12 The court noted that, "[ulnlike other provisions of the ADA, § 12112(d)(4)(A) does not refer to a 'qualified
individual'-a person who 'can perform the essential functions of the job'
he or she holds or desires 'with or without reasonable accommodation.'"'26 Instead, the court pointed out, the ADA provision refers to
an "employee."'2 7 The implication from the statutory language is that
Congress intended the ADA provision to cover not just persons who
qualify as "disabled" under the terms of the Act, but to cover any

employee.12
The Eleventh Circuit also employed a common-sense reading of the
statutory provision to come to its conclusion that it applies to disabled
and non-disabled employees alike. The court noted that it "'makes little
sense to require an employee to demonstrate that he has a disability to
prevent his employer from inquiring as to whether he has a disability.'"12 9 In other words, § 12112(d)(4XA) applies in situations where an
employer inquires into whether or not an employee has a disability, and
therefore it must cover employees who are not disabled or else their
employer would not need to make such an inquiry.' Nonetheless, the
Court concluded that Coke's mandatory evaluation of Owusu-Ansah was
both "job-related and consistent with business necessity," and therefore
valid under § 12112(d)(4)(A).x'

125. Id. at 1310-11.
126. Id. at 1310 (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(8), with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4XA)).
127. Id. at 1311 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)).
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, 124 F.3d 1221, 1229
(10th Cir. 1997)).
130. See id.
131. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(dX4XA)).
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